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HERMANN LOTZE'S CRITIQUE
OF JOHANNES MULLER'S DOCTRINE OF
SPECIFIC SENSE ENERGIES
WILLIAM R. WOODWARD*
DOES EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY follow Karl Popper's "logic ofscientific discovery",
advancing through falsification and refutation?' Or does it progress through
puzzle-solving within a paradigm, as Thomas Kuhncharacterized the "psychology of
research"?2 The case ofLotze's critique ofMiller's doctrine ofspecific sense energies
supports the Kuhn thesis. Even though Lotze's logical criteria did falsify and refute
the Miiller doctrine, the doctrine survived because of a quixotic allegiance to its
paradigm by the scientific community, illustrated by this passage from a typical
modemtextbook:
In 1826, long before much was known about nerve impulses, the great physiologist, Johannes
Muller, proposed a doctrine ofspecific nerve energies. The theory was that each sensory nerve
had its characteristic type of activity so that the optic nerve would signal light and color, the
auditory nerve the quality ofsound, the olfactory nerve that ofodor, and so on. This theory is
vividly expressed by the statement, "Ifwe could cross the auditory and optic nerves, we could
see thunder and hear lightning.""
Woodworth and Schlosberg go on to repeat a standard fact supporting the theory
that inadequate stimulation such as pressure on the right eyeball produces a dark
disc in the left margin of the visual field. Then they give the standard criticism, that
nerve impulses arefundamentally the same, and that sensory qualityrequires explana-
tion by localization or by patterns, but certainly not bydifferent kinds ofnerve alone.
Now that we have stated the law as it is remembered today, let us compare its very
first formulation. In 1826, at the age of twenty-five, Muller wrote in his first book,
Zur vergleichenden Physiologie des Gesichtssinnes des Menschen und der Thiere: "We
want to state right at the beginning the basic idea of all physiological investigation,
notonly ofvisionbut ofall theothersenses, which wecannotrepeatoftenenough, . . .
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that the energies of light, dark, and colour are not immanent in external things,
but in the visual substance itself."4 Where did this notion come from? The favourite
answer ofWundt and Helmholtz was Kant's epistemology. Both scientists thought it
was a physiological attempt to find the conditions of knowledge apriori.5 Be that as
it may, their views are suspiciously characteristic ofthe 1870s and 1880s, a period of
outspokenneo-Kantianismquitedifferentfromthat ofMuller.Incidentally,Wundtwas
critical of Miiller's law and proposed a law ofindifference offunction ofthe nervous
elements,6 while Helmholtz favoured it but revised it to apply to specific fibres instead
ofspecific nerves.7
The doctrine itselfhas two components which posterity hasjoined together: speci-
ficity and energy. Obviously "energies" did not refer to the substances whose con-
vertibility was discovered by various scientists in the 1840s, and not defined until the
1850s by Lord Kelvin.8 Probably the actual word came from either Purkynje, the
admirer ofGoethe whose writings on the subjective phenomena ofvision were closely
studied by Muller,9 or from Magendie, who used the term in describing the sensibility
of the nasal cavity.10 The explanation of living activities by the ascription of dis-
positional properties, however, was older. In 1755, von Haller termed the property of
muscles "irritability" and that of nerves "sensibility".11 The concept came to be
known as "excitation" when, in 1780, the Scottish physician John Brown put forward
the theory in his Elementa medicinae that all disease could be explained and treated
by raising or lowering the excitation of the body, and producing states which he
termedsthenia, ortension, andasthenia, orrelaxation.12 Thisviewwaswidely adopted
because of its therapeutic simplicity and its polar nature by German physicians and
Naturphilosophen, c. 1800.13 Thus naturphilosophische Medizin was well represented
4 J. Muller, Zur vergleichenden Physiologie des Gesichtssinnes desMenschen undder Thiere, Leipzig,
C. Cnobloch, 1826, pp. 44 45.
6 J. T. Merz, A history of European thought in the nineteenth century, New York, Dover, 1965,
vol. 2, pp. 483-484.
W. Wundt, Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie, Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1887, pp. 336-
339. For a comparison ofWundt's and Miller's views, see E. Montgomery, Mind, 1880, 5: lff.
7 Helmholtz's treatise on physiological optics, ed. by James Southall, trans. from 3rd German ed.,
The Optical Society of America, 1924, vol. 2, pp. 143-146.
8 T. S. Kuhn, 'Energy conservation as an example ofsimultaneous discovery', in M. Clagett (ed.),
Criticalproblems in the history of science, Madison, University of Wisconsin, 1969, pp. 320-359.
Cf. Merz, op. cit., note 5 above, vol. 2, pp. 98, 116. Thomas Young defined "Energy" as theproduct
of the weight and the velocity squared c. 1800, and William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) distinguished
another kind of"energy" as "the power to perform work" in 1892. Later these two kinds ofenergy
were named kinetic and potential.
9 J. Purkynje, Beobachtungen und Versuche zur Physiologie der Sinne, Prague, Calve, 1823, p. 73.
Cf. V. Kruta, J. E. Purkynje (1787-1869) Physiologist, Prague, Academia Publishing House of the
Czech Academy ofScience, 1969, p. 37. Muller cites him in op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 61-62.
10 F. Magendie, 'Le nerf olfactif est-il l'organe de l'odorat? Exp6riences sur cette question', J.
Physiol., 1824, 4: 170.
Il A. von Haller, A dissertation on the sensible and irritable parts ofanimals, introduction by 0.
Temkin, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1936, passim. The original Latin work was published at
London, J. Nourse, 1755, being a translation from the French version of Haller's paper 'De partibus
corporis humani sensibilibus et irritabilibus', Comment. Soc. Reg. Sci. Gottingen, 1753, 2: 114-158.
12 J. Brown, Elementa medicinae. Edinburgh, C. Elliot, 1780, trans. by the author, The elements
ofmedicine, London, J. Johnson, 1788.
18 B. Hirschel, Geschichte des Brown'schen Systems, 2nd ed., Leipzig, Arnoldische Buchhandlung,
1850.
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among Muller's teachers at Bonn University around 1820, including the physiologists
Christian Friedrich Nasse and Philip von Walther, Gottlob Kastner the friend of
Schelling, and the botanist Nees von Esenbeck a friend of Goethe.'4
Therefore Muller, in speaking of "energies", was using current conceptions of the
vital activity characteristic of life; however, in the implication that these were
"specific" to each sense he departed from the classic view of von Haller that all
sensory nerves had the sole property of sensitivity, undifferentiated by sense.15
Actually Miiller did not employ the word "specific", but he clearly implied this when
he wrote that "the optic nerve cannot even be affected without seeing itselfluminous,
the auditory nerve cannot be affected without sounding, the taste nerve not without
tasting, et cetera."'6 In 1838, inhis Handbuch der PhysiologiedesMenschen, he spelled
this out further: all stimuli, whether chemical, mechanical, or electrical, give rise to
a single kind ofsensation in anygiven.sensory pathway; conversely, the same stimulus
applied to different senses gives rise to different sensations.'7
Two formative experiences shed light on the origin ofMuller's law, and they reflect
his attitude towardsexperiment. BytrainingundervonWalther at Bonn and Rudolphi
at Berlin, Muller was a physiologist and anatomist.'8 But by predilection he was a
psychologist, and his teacher was Goethe; thus he wrote: "I have no second thoughts
about admitting how very much I owe to the inducements of Goethe's colour theory,
and can fairly say that without many years of studying it together with personal
observation of the phenomena the present researches would not have arisen.'9
Goethe's theory of light was simply that light is white and cannot be split into
colours.20 But Goethe's method, unlike Newton's, was psychological, for it asked the
subject to describe the visual phenomena directly, regardless ofobjective reality. It is
no accident that Miller sent his first book and a grateful letter to Goethe, and even
paid him a visit.2' The combined influence of Goethe and the great comparative
anatomist Rudolphi isevidentin Miiller's attitude expressed in his academic inaugural
lecture in 1824that"plain observation in anatomicalinvestigation isfarmore splendid
and superior to the reckless and often deceitful physiological experiment."22 In the
samelecture, Muller acknowledged that "acertain kind ofexperiment", thesectioning
14 M. Miller, 'Uber die philosophischen Anschauungen des Naturforschers Johannes MUller',
Archi. Gesch. Med., 1926, 18:131-132.
15 Von Haller, op. cit., note 11 above, p. 24.
1Mftller, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 6.
17 J. MiUller, Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen, Coblenz, J. Holscher, 1834-1840, vol. 2,
pp. 251-254, trans. by W. Baly as Elements ofphysiology, London, Taylor & Walton, 1842, vol. 2,
pp. 1061-1064. The section referred to was first published in 1838.
18 W. Haberling,JohannesMuller. DasLeben desRheinischenNaturforschers, Leipzig,Akademische
Verlagsgesellschaft M.B.H., 1924, pp. 42, 49-54.
19 MUller, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 395-396.
2oJ. W. von Goethe, Theory ofcolours, trans. by C. L. Eastlake with notes, Cambridge, Mass.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1970, reprinted from London, J. Murray, 1840, pp.
100-118. Cf. Helmholtz's Optics, op. cit., note 7 above, vol. 2, pp. 114-115.
21 Haberling, op. cit., note 18 above, pp. 97-98. Cf. Goethes Gesprache. Eine Sammlung zeit-
genossicher Berichte aus seinem Umgang, enl. and ed. by W. Herwig, ZUrich, Artemis Verlag, 1972,
vol. 3, Pt. 2, 1825-1832. p. 372.
" J. MaUller, 'Ober das Bedirfniss der Physiologie nach einer philosophischen Naturbetrachtung',
Antrittsvorlesung, 19 October 1824, reprinted as ch. 1, Miller, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 27-28.
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ofnerves, "leads to ... Urphenomena".23 The second formative experience, therefore,
was reading Magendie's 1824 experiments on sectioning the olfactory, trigeminal,
and optic nerves of a dog; Muller refused to believe Magendie's contention that
pricking the nerves afterwards did not produce smell, pain, and light, respectively.24
The reason for Muller's disbeliefwas his conviction, gained from Goethe's subjective
visual experiences and his own,25 that light could be excited by internal as well as
external causes. By this belief, which he stated as "the metamorphosis of the visual
substance" in imitation of Goethe's Plant metamorphosis, he meant that sensations
are specific qualities ofthe nervous pathways all the way from the sense organ to the
sensorium.26
It was Rudolph Hermann Lotze, sixteen years later, who first dared to challenge
Miller's assertion outright. He too was only twenty-five when he wrote in his first
book,AilgemeinePathologieundTherapiealsmechanischeNaturwissenschaften, in 1842:
It is false to claim with assurance that the higher sensory nerves always react to a stimulus
exclusively by functional expressions, never by pain. The single experiment which seems to
speak for the doctrine of specific nerve energy in a decisive way is the sectioning of the optic
nerve, whichassomeclaimissupposed tobeaccompanied notbypainbutbyavisualappearance.
Around this one observation, if we want to be honest, the far-reaching doctrine of specific
nerve energies has spread out, while supporting itself upon this sole analogy and repeatedly
referring to it, it has established the two parts of its claim, that (1) every nerve reacts to inade-
quate stimuli by its functional expression, and (2) it also reacts exclusively by this.'7
In effect, Lotze was defending Magendie; however, it is likely that he acquired his
critical attitude toward Muller's work from his three teachers at Leipzig University,
Ernst Heinrich Weber, Alfred Wilhelm Volkmann, and Gustav Theodor Fechner,
who were contemporaries ofMuller. In 1834, Weber had patently ignored the theory
in writing about hearing and touch.28 In 1836, Volkmann objected in his book
Neue Beitrdge zur Physiologie des Gesichtssinnes that sensations and mind should not
be separated, as MUller had done in writing about nerve energies, and that experience
I' Ibid., p. 26.
"1 F. Magendie, 'De l'influence de la cinquieme paire de nerfs sur la nutrition et les fonctions de
l'oeil', J. Physiol., 1824, 4: 180. Muller did not cite this experiment until 1838 (Elements, op. cit.,
note 12 above, vol. 2, p. 1069), however he appears to refer indirectly to it in 1826 (Gesichtssinnes,
op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 20-27). Another indirect reference to Magendie is found in J. Miiller,
Uber die phantastischen Gesichtserscheinungen, ed. by M. Miller, Leipzig, A. Barth, 1927, p. 20:
"When a French physiologist has proven through experiment, therefore, to his own great astonish-
ment, that the optic nerve has a so-called specific sensitivity for external light but no sense oftouch
for mechanical irritation, i.e., it senses no resistance, no pain, no warmth, then we wish this physi-
ology only theadvance that it realize how theoptic nerve does not senseexternal things as resistance,
but reacts to every external thing, to the knife as to thestimulus [oflight], byluminance. If, however,
the optic nerve is illuminated by every external thing no matter what, then no reasonable basis
remains for it to sense pleasure and pain also. That entire investigation of the lack of a sense of
pain in the optic nerve appears to [our] physiological conception as a mystification of the
investigator."
"Ibid., passim; Goethe, op. cit., note 20 above, pp. 1-55.
" Miller, Gesichtserscheinungen, op. cit., note 24 above, p. 23; J. W. von Goethe, Versuch die
Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erkiliren, Gotha, C. W. Ettinger, 1790.
"7Rudolph Hermann Lotze, Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische Naturwissen-
schaften, Leipzig, Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung, 1842, p. 155.
*8 E. H. Weber, Depulsu, resorptione, auditu et tactu: Annotationes anatomicae etphysiologicae,
Leipzig, C. F. Koehler, 1834.
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was a factor in the recognition of external objects by newborn animals and persons
with their sight newly restored after blindness.29 And in 1838 and 1840, Fechner
reported on subjective colours, complementary colours, and after-images without
mentioning Muller's doctrine.30
Concurrent with his medical education, Lozte received a thorough grounding in
philosophy under Christian Hermann Weisse.31 As Eduard von Hartmann later
remarked, "it is basically through the glasses of Weisse that [Lotze] saw Hegelian
dialectic and Hegelian idealism."32 In 1835, Weisse had published Grundziuge der
Metaphysik styled after Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik.33 Its thesis was being, and
its antithesis, thought; it differed in its synthesis, however. Instead ofthe "Absolute
Idea", Weisse's synthesis was Fiirsichseyn, "being for self", i.e., sensation, freedom,
and "the postulation ofoneselfby specification"."' Lotze came to similar conclusions
in his medical dissertation in 1838." The monad of Leibniz became for Lotze, as it
been for Weisse, the best example of the enmergence of sensation in an otherwise
mechanistic world description. The monad had an active capacity "to specify itself",
and a passive capacity to occupy space and submit to change.3 Instead of Leibniz'
attribute ofmind, "perception", Lotze chose Weisse's term "specification", although
he replaced it with "sensory quality" three years later in his first book, Metaphysik.37
Another important influence on Lotze's view of the nature of sensation was the
Gottingen philospher, to whose chair Lotze was called in 1845, Johann Friedrich
Herbart. Herbart opposed idealism with his own brand ofrealism, and he substituted
a "hairsplitting manner" for the grand strokes of the dialectic.38 In his Metaphysik
of 1828, Herbart took the example from Kant that "one hundred real coins contain
not the least more than one hundred possible ones."39 Lotze, in his Metaphysik of
1841, commented that "the possible (thought) hundred coins behave ... neither as
physical substances upon impact with other bodies, nor do they produce through
theirvalue amovementintheworld; onebuysnothingwith them."40 Herbartregarded
Il A. W. Volkmann, Neue Beitrdge zur Physiologie des Gesichtssinnes, Leipzig, Breitkopf und
H&rtel, 1836, pp. 18-20.
30 G. T. Fechner, 'Ueber die subjectiven Complementarfarben', Ann. Physik Chemie, 1838, 44:
(120): 220-245, 513-535; 'Ueber eine Scheibe zur Erzeugung subjectiver Farben', ibid., 1838, 45
(121): 227-232, 'Ueber die subjectiven Nachbilder und Nebenbilder', ibid., 1840, 50 (126): 193-221,
427470.
31 M. Wentscher, Hermann Lotze, Heidelberg, C. Winter, 1913, pp. 24-30.
" E. von Hartmann, Lotze's Philosophie, Leipzig, W. Friedrich, 1888, pp. 25-26.
" C. H. Weisse, GrundzlJge der Metaphysik, Hamburg, F. Perthes, 1835; G. W. F. Hegel, Wissen-
schaftderLogik, ed. by L. vonHenning, vols. 3,4,5 inHegel's Werke, Berlin, DunckerundHumblot,
1833-1834.
" Weisse, op. cit., note 33 above, pp. 533, 561.
u R. H. Lotze, Defuturae biologlae principiis philosophicis, Leipzig, Breitkopf und Hiirtel, 1838,
reprinted in Kleine Schriften von Hermann Lotze, ed. by D. Peipers, Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1885, vol. 1,
pp. 1-25.
I' Ibid., pp. 22-25. Cf. Lotze's undated essay from this period, 'Pensees d'un idiote sur Descartes,
Spinoza et Leibnitz', in Kleine Schriften, op. cit., note 35 above, vol. 3, pp. 558-566.
S" R. H. Lotze, Metaphysik, Leipzig, Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung, 1841, p. 271.
I' Hartmann, op. cit., note 32 above, pp. 31-35.
"@ J. F. Herbart, Allgemeine Metaphysik nebst denAnfdngen derphilosophischen Naturlehre, 2 vols.,
Kbnigsberg, A. W. Unzer, 1828-1829, vol. 1, pp. 73-74, citing I. Kant, Critik der reinen Vernunft,
Riga, J. F. Hartknoch, 1790, p. 627.
"Lotze, op. cit., note 37 above, p. 51.
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the being of an object as determined by its reference to real qualities, while Lotze
regarded it as determined by reciprocal relations to other objects.41 Both opposed
Hegel's identification of the qualities, which are thought, with the object, which
exists, in the Absolute. By a similar line of argument, Lotze defined sensation as a
kindofreciprocalrelation between thoughtand object.42 When onemonad"specifies"
another, when one individual "perceives" another, and when a higher power "pre-
scribes" the ends of the universe, the meaning or value of sensation reduces to an
ethical judgment.43 Despite a realistic definition of sensation in the realm of being,
Lotze conceded to it an idealistic definition in the realm ofvalue.
Idealism and realism together were the groundwork of Lotze's philosophy; how-
ever he expressed them under the abbreviation of "occasionalism" in his scientific
books whichfollowed. In theAllgemeine Pathologie, heexplained that "ideal qualities
of sensitivity are incommensurable with the physical events which occasion them.""
Neither the ideal event nor the real one need be neglected by the scientist. But it
wouldbe amistake to understand themasreciprocal causes ofone another, as Miller
had done." Lotze noted that the qualities ofsensations are "a production ofthe soul
according toitsownlaws,and do notdepend atallonthenature ofthephysical stimuli
except that these offer signals for the soul to create ideas."46 A strict solution to the
problem ofthe reciprocaleffect betweenthe soul and the bodywould haveto go back
to the origin of the concepts of matter, movement, and idea. However, the natural
sciences need not reduce every single phenomenon to the true metaphysical relations
which underlie it.47
The origin of Lotze's mechanistic conception of scientific explanation, as con-
trasted with his ideo-realistic views of the nature ofreality, was his Logik of 1843.48
Logic for Lotze did not comprise mental operations by which inferences are made in
real thought; it consisted rather of the ideal forms of thought.49 The qualities of
sensation and the properties ofobjects were held apart, as empirical or metaphysical
questions, from the marks of concepts, a logical question.50 Recognizing that the
classical figures of the syllogism (subsumption, induction, and analogy) were only
idealforms,Lotzenevertheless tried tomake them.refer to realparticulars. He showed
how mathematical inferences could serve to make specific the marks of the concept,
either by substituting numbers, or forming proportions where quantification was
impossible, or making equations.5' For example, he described the event in which
41 Herbart, op. cit., note 39 above, vol. 2, pp. 71-142; Lotze, op. cit., note 37 above, pp. 50-68.
42 Ibid., pp. 278-290.
" Ibid., pp. 323-329.
" R. H. Lotze, Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische Naturwissenschaften, Leipzig,
Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung, 1842, p. 150.
46Miuller, Handbuch, op. cit., note 17 above, vol. 2, pp. 1382-1399. Cf. Elements, op. cit., note 17
above, vol. 2, pp. 553-569.
'3Lotze, op. cit., note 44 above, p. 59.
"Ibid., pp. 56-57.
48 R. H. Lotze, Logik, Leipzig, Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung, 1843.
49 H. W. Blount, 'Logic, II. History', Ecyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., New York, The
Encyclopaedia Britannica Co., 1911, vol. 16, p. 915.
6o Lotze, op. cit., note 48 above, p. 193.
1 Ibid., pp. 190-213.
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undulations of light give rise to the colours of sensation as an inference from pro-
portion: such alogical relation is a hypothesis about thesenatural phenomena which,
if verified by experiment and quantified by mathematics, could become a natural
law.52
Was Muller's doctrine such a natural law? Muller had generalized that all stimuli
giveriseto only onekind ofsensation in agivensensorymodality. Althoughobviously
not quantifiable, this proposition rested heavily on the evidence of the "phantastic
visual phenomena", which Miuller assumed to come from inner stimuli to the specific
fibres. Introducing a distinction between adequate and inadequate stimuli, Lotze
put forth a hypothesis diametrically opposed to Miiller's, that "every sensation-
producingprocess in anerveis always brought aboutby its definite adequate stimulus
alone."53 The optic nerve is stimulated by light, the auditory nerve by sound, and
so on, always producing a normal sensation for that sense. On the other hand, the
optic nerve can also be stimulated by congestion or fever, the auditory nerve by a
blow to the head; Lotze's point was that these sensations resulting from inadequate
stimuli were abnormal ones. Thus Lotze came to the ironic conclusion in 1842 that
Muller's doctrine "is founded almost solely on pathological cases, and as it appears,
not very securely."" He softened this verdict in 1848 and wrote: "One can say,
therefore, that the theory ofspecific energy does not stand upon all that many facts;
we are satisfied, without entering into the matter, with the result sufficient for our
purposes that there are many sensations which come from unusual, namely inner,
stimuli. These sensations belong to the class ofusual ones for each nerve, irrespective
of whether those inner stimuli, although unusual, were adequate to excite them,
or if inadequate, have produced them by virtue of such a specific energy."55
It is noteworthy that Lotze used the term "addquater Reiz" (adequate stimulus),
in view of E. G. Boring's claim that C. S. Sherrington invented the term in 1906.6
How was this challenge to the doctrine received? At Berlin, where Muller's interest
had again turned to comparative anatomy, there was no reply. However, his students
Jacob Henle and Hermann Helmholtz continued to promulgate variations of the
theory.57 At Leipzig, E. H. Weber raised serious questions about the doctrine and
presented a mass of contrary evidence in his 1846 article "Der Tastsinn und das
Gemeingsfiihl".58 Meanwhile in 1844, Lotze's friend and former teacher A. W.
Volkmann, now at Halle, sided with Lotze, though not without reservations: "I
believe with Lotze that this theory is opposed by very basic considerations, although
Ibid., pp. 205-206; 224-230.
6S Lotze, op. cit., note 44 above, p. 156.
uIbid., p. 152.
6 R. H. Lotze, Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische Naturwissenschaften, 2nd
rev. ed., Leipzig, Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung, 1848, p. 159.
Lotze, op. cit., note 44 above, p. 156. E. G. Boring, A history ofexperimentalpsychology, New
York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, p. 87.
5? J. Henle, Allgemeine Anatomie, Leipzig, L. Voss, 1841, pp. 739-753; H. Helmholtz, 'Ueber die
Natur der menschlichen Sinnesempfindungen', a lecture delivered at his Habilitation as ordentlicher
Professor on 28 June 1852, published with his Habilitationsschrift, 'Ueber die Theorie der zusam-
mengesetzten Farben', 3 July 1852, 24 pp., Berlin, Gebruder Unger, 1852.
68 E. H. Weber, 'Der Tastsinn und das Gemeingefihl', in Handworterbuch der Physiologie, ed.
by R. Wagner, Braunschweig, F. Vieweg, 1846, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 507-511.
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I would not turn it around and want to claim that 'each specific sensation is always
brought about by a specifically determined stimulus and its changes.' "59
Lotze answered Volkmann in 1846 in an essay called "Seele und Seelenleben",
where he explained that by stimulus he meant the entire state ofthe nervous system."
Volkmann had taken issue with a simple logical law, wrote Lotze, that equal condi-
tions have equal consequences; hence, a certain state of the nervous system would
alwaysresultin acertain sensation. Thus, theinception ofLotze'schallenge to Muller
was misunderstood in Halle, and it fell on deaf ears in Berlin and Leipzig.
Itisworthpausingforamomenttoconsider thisessayaboutthesoul. Twohundred
pages long, it dealt with the empirical nature of the soul (excluding free will, but
including the phenomena of sensory quality, sensory localization, feeling, ideas, and
theunityofconsciousness), all ofwhich theauthorattempted torelate to physiological
conditions and the available explanatory principles of natural science. Wherever
possible, itsetforthhypothesesandtheoriesforexperimentalinvestigationbyascience
ofpsychology as yet unfounded. For example, on the question ofwhere the specificity
of the senses originates, Lotze suggested two possible hypotheses: one was Volk-
mann's that some kind of correction apparatus limits a nerve to certain classes of
sensations. Thinkingthatthis wasruled outbythe anatomical similarity ofall nerves,
Lotze preferred the other hypothesis ofG. H. Meyer, that specific energies were only
acquired habits in the nerves.61 The latter hypothesis was more easily reconciled with
the cautionary advice ofE. H. Weber, who wrote: "One should not, it seems to me,
overestimate the influence of the central organs with which the inner endings of the
nerves connect in the origin ofspecifically different sensations, nor should one under-
estimate the influence ofthe auxiliary organs in the external endings ofthe nerves."62
Actually, Lotze had adopted the hypothesis from Weber that the structure of the
peripheral sense organs allowed only a certain class ofstimuli to affect each sensory
nerve, whereas the structure of the nerves themselves was identical and could play
no role in the specificity of sensation.0
As for the qualitative differences in sensation within a given sense, further explana-
tion was called for. Volkmann had criticized Muller harshly here: "The observation
satisfies me that the red light wave transmits another sensation than the blue, and a
slowly oscillating string another tone than a rapidly oscillating one. Herewith the
doctrine ofspecific excitability is shaken in its foundation.""
Lotze went even further, and suggested the "phantasy" that no qualitative dif-
ferences could occur in the body which were not differences ofmagnitude, direction,
duration, or a combination of these. This physical series of processes would release
first the sensations of tone, gradually climbing to the sensations ofcolour. "Despite
' A. W. Volkmann, 6Nervenphysiologie', in ibid., 1844, vol. 2, p. 521, citing Lotze, Pathologie,
op. cit., note 44 above, p. 164.
" R. H. Lotze, 'Seele und Seelenleben', in Handworterbuch, op. cit., note 58 above, vol. 3, pt. 1,
p. 159; reprinted in Kleine Schriften, 2: 30-31.
"1 Lotze, Handworterbuch, op. cit., note 58 above, vol. 3, pp. 162-163, and in Kleine Schriften,
op. cit., note 35 above, vol. 2, pp. 32-35.
"Weber, op. cit., note 58 above, vol. 3., p. 507.
" Lotze, Pathologie, op. cit., note 44 above, p. 157.
"Volinnan, op. cit., note 59 above, vol. 2, p. 522.
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the qualitative incomparability of both kinds of processes," concluded Lotze, "we
find in contrast a proportionality, the further pursuit of which could secure for
psychology a wealth of information."65 This brilliant speculation, adhering to the
mechanical principles of explanation developed in Lotze's Logik, was anticipated
by Fechner's Habilitationsschrift, "Premises toward a general theory of organisms"
in 1823 and confirmed by Fechner's announcement of thepsychophysical law in the
Zend-Avesta in 1851.66
Incidentally, I have found no indication by Fechner or by Lotze that Fechner's
law owed anything to Lotze's proposal of a proportionality between the "mathe-
matical differences" of nervous processes and sensation; yet I do feel that Lotze
performed animportant serviceforthescientificcommunitywhen, inhismajorworks,
AllgemeinePhysiologie des korperlichen Lebens in 1851, and Medicinische Psychologie
oder Physiologie der Seele the year after,67 he separated the physiological from the
psychological issues for perhaps the first time in any language. The physiological
issues turned on the nature ofthe nervous principle; Du Bois Reymond had revived
the hypothesis that electricity was transmitted in the nerve medulla and insulated by
the nerve sheath, while Rudolph Wagner, Albert K6lliker, and Volkmann had each
described the cellular nature ofthe neural elements.68 Admitting that an undulation
theory of nervous conduction was as uncertain as an emission or electrical one,
Lotze offered apreliminary hypothesis ofanequilibrium offorces amongtheelements
of the nerve, capable of disturbance by a stimulus and recovery by nutritional
processes."
In his Medicinische Psychologie of 1852, Lotze abandoned the viewpoint of the
single nerve and traced the origin of a single sensation through six stages: external
stimulus, inner sensory stimulus, nervous event, brain event, then the psychical
impression in the soul, which may be unconscious, and finally the conscious sensory
quality, such as a tone or a colour.70 Compared with the "metamorphosis of the
visual substance" in Muller's exposition of a quarter of a century before, this was a
considerable advance. Muller's "energies" hadgivenway to aproportionality between
' Lotze, Handw&rterbuch, op. cit., note 60 above, vol. 3, pp. 167-168, and in Kleine Schriften,
2: 37-38.
" Fechner had proposed a quasi-logarithmic relationship between soul and body in his Habilita-
tionsschrift in 1823, and he announced a logarithmic law to relate sensation and stimulus in 1851
and 1860. Cf. M. E. Marshall, 'G. T. Fechner: premises toward ageneral theoryoforganisms (1823)',
unpublished MSS., at Carleton University, Ottawa, 1972. Lotze suggested a proportionality, but he
remained sceptical of the logarithmic law even as late as 1880-1881 when, in his final psychology
lecture course, he commented that the following question is still to be answered: "Why does this
characteristic relation occur at all, and why does the sensation not grow quite simply in proportion
to the stimulus, which would be much more natural. None ofthe established theories is satisfactory,
but the most probable assumption is that in the transformation ofextemal stimuli in neural excita-
tions something goes on which requires the latter to increase much more slowly than the external
stinuli grow." H. Lotze, Grundzuge der Psychologie. Dictate aus den Vorlesungen, Leipzig, S. Hirzel,
1881, p. 11.
6? R. H. Lotze, Allgemeine Physiologie des korperlichen Lebens, Leipzig, Weidmann'sche Buch-
handlung, 1851; R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seek, Leipzig,
Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung, 1852.
" Lotze, Physiologie, op. cit., note 67 above, pp. 389-393.
" Ibid., pp. 400-401.
70 Lotze, Psychologie, op. cit., note 67 above, pp. 173-181.
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three disparate processes: the stimulus, the nervous excitation, and the conscious
sensation. Lotze also replaced the "specific" determination of these energies, which
for Muller was nothing more than an ascribed disposition, with a review of the
evidence for qualitative differences at each stage in the chain of sensation. The
stimuli could be adequate or inadequate by degrees.71 The nerves maintain a specific
tension, analogous to a string stretched between two points: disattach it ateither end,
and it can no longer resonate.72 Finally, the brain may be involved in the "vicarious
sensations", known to us as "synesthesias", in which one sense sees, hears, smells,
tastes, or feels for another.73
Despite its prominence in three books from 1842 to 1852, as well as in Wagner's
prestigious Handwirterbuch der Physiologie, Lotze's critique went unmentioned by
Wundt as well as by Weber, Fechner, Helmholtz, and Muller himself. Yet if the
agreement on the part of E. H. Weber, A. W. Volkmann, and Lotze is any measure,
the criticisms were justified and the Muller doctrine, as it stood, was wrong.7' Why
this neglect of a justified critique, and why the continued allegiance by Henle,
Helmholtz, and others to an imperfect doctrine?
I suggest that an answer may be found in the Kuhn-Popper debate ofthe 1960s.75
Logical criticisms and data difficult to digest, especially when they come from a
philosopher-physician who was not an experimenter, are not sufficient to bring down
a scientific theory, much less to bring about a scientific revolution. Rather, it seems
to be the case that personal prestige such as Muller commanded, not to mention a
fundamental improvement by Helmholtz, did succeed in maintaining the theory for
a time.
Only in this century has the tide turned back toward Lotze. The Muller doctrine
had become almost unassailable after Helmholtz replaced the specific sensory path-
ways with specific fibres within the senses.76 In 1895, for example, von Frey proposed
one kind offibre for each of the four sensory qualities of touch-pressure, warmth,
71 Ibid., pp. 188-189.
71 Ibid., pp. 190-191.
7' Ibid., pp. 194-197. Cf. L. E. Marks, 'Oncolored-hearing synaesthesia: Cross-modal translations
ofsensory dimensions', Psychol. Bull., 1975, in press.
74 ",In the final analysis, one arrives at the conclusion that the law ofspecific energies ofthe senses
rested on an Aristotelian or metaphysical, rather than an anatomical or physiological, argument,"
wrote W. Riese and G. E. Arrington, Jr., op. cit., note 3 above, p. 182. Cf. R. Weinmann, op. cit.,
note 3 above, pp. 39-42 andconclusion, pp. 95-96: "1. Thefacts ofa specific reaction to anystimulus
demand an explanation in the sense of Lotze. The mere use of 'specific sense energies' means the
introduction ofmysterious force principles: it means the renunciation ofan explanation.... 2. The
doctrine of specific energies would more accurately carry the name 'doctrine of the different con-
stitution of the physiological carriers of sensation'.... 3. The so-called new doctrine of specific
energiesstandsindirectoppositiontothekeypointoftheparentdoctrine. Italsoseemsunjustified....
4. The qualitative and quantitative rarity, the thoroughly abnormal character of the facts of the
doctrinemustbedecisivelyemphasized.... 5. Thedoctrineofspecificenergiescannot serve as support
for either the (unjustified) subjectivism of modem sensory psychology nor as empirical proof for
the (justified) doctrine ofthe subjectivity ofthe secondary qualities. The doctrine ofspecific energies
has solely physiological interest."-
76 T. S. Kuhn, 'Logic of discovery or psychology of research?', and K. R. Popper, 'Normal
science and its dangers', in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism andthegrowth ofknowledge,
Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 1-24, 51-58.
76 See E. G. Boring, Sensation andperception in the history ofexperimentalpsychology, New York,
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1942, pp. 72-73.
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cold, and pain.77 However, new techniques and data have sincecastdoubtupon such
a simple one-to-one correspondence between psychological, physiological, and
anatomical elements. Critics have suggested that the use of punctate stimuli elicited
sensory specificity, whereas sensory fibres are actually much more "broadly tuned".7
Thus pattern theory offers another way to interpret the data, by assigning qualitative
differences to a pattern of responses across many neural elements.7' In disguised
form, perhaps, Lotze's critique and Muller's doctrine have come back to haunt the
present generation of philosophers and scientists.80
77 A. J. McKeag, The sensation ofpain and the theory ofspecific sense energies, Boston, Mass.,
Ginn, 1902, p. 40; cf. pp. 45-69 for a review of the specific sense energy question at the turn of the
century.
7 R. P. Erickson, 'Stimulus coding in topographic and non-topographicafferentmodalities: on the
significance ofthe activitity ofindividual sensory neurons', Psychol. Rev., 1968, 75: 447-465.
7§ Woodworth andSchlosberg's experimentalpsychology, ed. by J. W. Klng and L. A. Riggs, New
York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971, pp. 179-181.
" Cf. U. Ebbecke, Johannes Mfiler: der grosse rhelnische Physiologe, Hannover, Schmorl & von
Seefeld Nachf., 1951, pp. 62-72, who reinterprets the Mililerian view in terms ofa "point by point
connection" between sense organ and the central cortical neurons; Ebbecke bridges the mind-body
relation with the conclusion that "all these [cortical] centers, whose name 'center' is not be to taken
literally, are themselves no longer sensory, theirexcitation is no longer experienced as sensation but
as idea, ideo-sensorially or ideationally." In private communication with the author, Prof. Dr.
Rothschuh has commented that "if one investigates the sections in Johannes Miller's treatment
having to do less with the specific sensory energies of the nervous tracts or fibres than with the
corresponding central parts, then one can today still hold to Mtller's conception." Cf. K. E.
Rothschuh, 'Spezifische Sinnesenergien', Historisches Handworterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim
Ritter, Basle/Stuttgart, Schwabe, 1971ff(in press).
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